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Abstract 
The hopelessness model (Abramson et al., 1989) and response style theory (Nolen-Hoeksema et 
al., 1992) have been integrated in various ways, but these integrations have not been compared. 
German college students (N = 311; mean age = 23.27 years, SD = 6.57 years, 80% female) rated 
their depressive symptoms, negative inferences, and rumination three times.  Findings supported 
an integrated model where individual inferences predict and interact with the rumination subtype 
brooding to affect depressive symptoms. 
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 Two major cognitive theories to explain the development and maintenance of depression 
are the hopelessness model (Abramson, Alloy, & Metalsky, 1989) and the Response Style 
Theory (RST; Nolen-Hoeksema, Girgus, & Seligman, 1992).  The empirically supported (see for 
reviews Abramson et al., 2002; Thomsen, 2006) models offer a theoretical rationale for which 
constructs contribute to the onset and maintenance of depression and they are associated with 
effective interventions (e.g., Hawley et al., 2014; Michalak, Hölz, & Teismann, 2011).  Thus, an 
empirically-supported theoretical model integrating both theories and describing how the 
variables proposed in one model relate to the variables of the other model would provide a 
theoretical framework for how therapeutic techniques from one cognitive model can influence 
constructs from another model.  Moreover, an integrative model may allow increased 
effectiveness of cognitive psychotherapies for depressive symptoms as counselors can integrate 
therapeutic techniques from different cognitive models into one theory-driven treatment 
approach (e.g., Hawley et al.; Michalak et al.).  Thus, the purpose of the present study is to test 
and compare multiple theoretically possible models to integrate the hopelessness model and the 
RST into one model to explain the development and maintenance of depression.   
Hopelessness Model 
The hopelessness model (Abramson et al., 1989) proposes that negative inferences and 
hopelessness work in a sequence to cause depressive symptoms.  The negative inferences about 
negative events form what is called a negative cognitive style.  Individuals with this style will 
make negative inferences about a negative event’s (1) internality of cause, (2) stability of cause, 
(3) globality of cause, and (4) consequences, and (5) characteristics of him/herself following the 
event.  Negative inferences about stability, globality, consequences, and characteristics of the 
self but not inferences about internality are proposed to lead to hopelessness (Abramson et al., 
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1989), which triggers the development of a variety of symptoms of hopelessness depression, a 
subtype of depression.  While negative inferences about internality of cause do not lead to 
hopelessness, they lead to low self-esteem, another symptom of hopelessness depression.  While 
the different negative inferences are traditionally summarized into a composite score (Haeffel et 
al., 2008), studies with college students in the Midwestern U.S. (65.2% female; Haeffel, 2010) 
and Canadian adults in a clinical sample (86.1% female; Abela, Aydin, & Auerbach, 2006) found 
evidence that more variance of depressive symptoms is explained when considering the 
individual negative inferences.  In other words, the individual negative inferences and not the 
composite score should be studied as the later one can mask one very negative inferential style 
because the other inferences are less negative.  While empirically well supported (see for a 
review Abramson et al., 2002), the inferences proposed in the hopelessness model do not 
completely explain the development and maintenance of depressive symptoms.  Thus, additional 
predictors should be considered and integrated into the hopelessness model.  One possible 
cognitive construct that it missing in the hopelessness model but that is also related to the 
development and maintenance of depressive symptoms is how individuals process and respond 
to their depressive mood (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1992).  
Response Style Theory 
The RST asserts that the individual’s cognitive response to his/her depressive mood 
determines the onset, severity, and length of a depressive episode (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1992).  
Individuals who react to a depressive mood by repetitively thinking about their mood and the 
consequences of the mood are said to have a ruminative response style, which magnifies his/her 
depressive mood.  This ruminative response style can be divided into three subtypes: Brooding, 
reflection, and depression-related rumination (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003).  
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However, the authors noted that the depression-related subtype simply reflects depressive 
symptoms, rather than representing a ruminative response style, and suggested to focus on the 
two other ruminative subtypes.  Brooding involves moody and passive thinking about one’s 
actions or situation (e.g., thinking about how a situation could have gone differently), whereas 
reflection has a neutral valence and involves a problem-solving approach (e.g., analyzing why 
events make one feel a certain way) with the goal of contemplation and understanding one’s 
depressive mood.  Despite positive correlations between brooding and reflection, only brooding 
was found to be a consistent predictor of depressive symptoms in college students and 
outpatients treated for depression in Hong Kong (77% female; Lo, Ho, & Hollon, 2008) in 
Western U.S. adults (53.5% female; Treynor et al.), in German adolescents (34.7% female; 
Winkeljohn Black & Pössel, 2013) and in Southern U.S. adolescents (63.9% female; Winkeljohn 
Black & Pössel, 2015).  The situation regarding reflection is less consistent as some have found 
no association with depressive symptoms (Lo et al.; Winkeljohn Black & Pössel) while others 
found significant associations between reflection and depressive symptoms (Treynor et al.). 
Integrating the Hopelessness Model and the Response Style Theory 
Similarities between both models and associations between negative inferences outlined 
in the hopelessness model (Abramson et al., 1989) and RST (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1992) are 
obvious.  One of apparent similarity between both cognitive models is their classification as 
cognitive vulnerability-stress models.  This implies that the interactions between cognitive 
vulnerabilities and activating negative events are used to explain why some individuals develop 
depression while others do not.  Beyond this relatively crude classification, studies found 
rumination predicts hopelessness (Lavender & Watkins, 2004) and (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1995 [second study reported]) and even that hopelessness mediates the association 
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between rumination and depressive symptoms (Sarin, Abela, & Auerbach, 2005).  Finally, the 
authors themselves have pointed out different possible associations between negative inferences 
and rumination (Abramson et al., 1989; Alloy et al., 2000).  However, neither of the models 
includes both negative inferences and rumination.  Thus, a theory-driven and empirically 
supported model integrating the hopelessness model and the RST is needed.  
One suggested combination of both cognitive vulnerability models is a moderation model 
(Alloy et al., 2000; Ciesla & Roberts, 2007; Figure 1, top).  Alloy et al. suggested that 
individuals who have negative inferences and ruminate about these inferences are more likely to 
develop depressive symptoms than individuals who have only one or neither of these cognitive 
vulnerabilities.  Ciesla and Roberts expanded on this proposition by outlining that rumination 
might affect the influence of negative inferences by bringing them to mind more often.  
Supporting this moderation model, Alloy and colleagues found in their cross-sectional study that 
individuals with a cognitive risk (a combination of a composite of negative inferences about 
stability, globality, consequences, and the self and dysfunctional attitudes; Beck, 1976) and a 
ruminative response style were more likely to have a history of major depression than individuals 
with only one or neither of these cognitive vulnerabilities.  However, two experimental (Ciesla & 
Roberts, [second and third studies reported]) and two longitudinal studies did not find empirical 
support for this moderation model (Ciesla, Felton, & Roberts, 2011; Robinson & Alloy, 2003).   
Despite Alloy and colleagues’ (2000) support for the moderation model, their study has 
some limitations.  First, the authors used retrospective data.  Second, Alloy et al. used cognitive 
risk, a combination of negative inference style and dysfunctional attitudes - a construct from 
Beck’s theory (1976) of depression.  Third, rumination but not its subtypes brooding and 
reflection were examined.  While two longitudinal studies (Pössel, 2011; Winkeljohn Black & 
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Pössel, 2015) did not find support for the influence of an interaction between dysfunctional 
attitudes and either of the ruminative subtypes on depressive symptoms, another study found 
support for the influence of a dysfunctional attitudes by brooding interaction (Winkeljohn Black 
& Pössel, 2013).  Thus, it is possible that the significant effect of the interaction between 
cognitive risk and rumination in Alloy et al.’s (2000) study was not related to the negative 
inferences but to dysfunctional attitudes. 
Ciesla’s laboratory (Ciesla & Roberts, 2007 [second and third study reported]) and 
longitudinal studie (Ciesla et al., 2011) overcame the limitations in Alloy et al.’s (2000) study.  
However, neither of their studies found support for the attribution style by rumination (brooding 
and reflection) interaction predicting depressive symptoms.  However, Ciesla and colleagues 
(Ciesla & Roberts; Ciesla et al.) measured only attribution style (composite of negative 
inferences about internality, stability, and globality).  Thus, it is unclear if either or both 
ruminative subtypes are moderators in the associations between some or all of the individual 
negative inferences and depressive symptoms.  Further, it is unclear if rumination or its subtypes 
moderate the associations between all or only some of the negative inferences outlined in the 
hopelessness theory. 
Another proposed model to integrate negative inferences (Abramson et al., 1989) and 
rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1992) is a mediation model (Figure 1, middle).  Abramson 
et al. stated that individuals experiencing hopelessness might ruminate, leading to attention and 
sleep problems.  Thus, rumination may be a mediator between negative inferences and 
depressive symptoms.  Three studies support this mediation hypothesis.  In their longitudinal 
study Spasojević and Alloy (2001) found that rumination fully mediated the positive association 
between negative inferences (measured as a composite score of negative inferences about 
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stability, globality, consequences, and the self) and future depressive episodes.  Similarly, in the 
two cross-sectional studies Lo et al. (2008) found that brooding partially mediated the positive 
association between attribution style (negative inferences about internality, stability, and 
globality) and self-reported depressive symptoms.  Moreover, reflection did not mediate the 
association between attribution style and depressive symptoms in either of Lo et al.’s samples. 
In sum, there is empirical support for rumination, particularly the brooding subtype, as 
mediator between negative inferences and depressive symptoms.  However, it is unclear whether 
rumination is especially important for specific individual negative inferences (i.e., stability, 
globality, internality, consequences, and characteristics of the self).  As negative inferences about 
stability, globality, consequences, and characteristics of the self but not inferences about 
internality are proposed to lead to hopelessness (Abramson et al., 1989), one could speculate that 
internality inferences are not associated with rumination.  However, Lo et al. (2008) included 
internality inferences alongside the other four inferences in their study and found that rumination 
only partially mediated the association between negative inferences and depressive symptoms.  
In contrast, Spasojević and Alloy’s (2001) study did not include internality inferences and they 
found rumination fully mediated the association between negative inferences and depressive 
symptoms.  Thus, while one might speculate about differential associations between the 
individual negative inferences and rumination, no study has evaluated rumination (or brooding, 
specifically) as mediator in the association between individual negative inferences and 
depressive symptoms yet.  In addition, only cross-sectional studies (e.g., Lo et al.) have 
researched brooding and reflection as separate mediators alongside constructs from the 
hopelessness theory.  Thus, based on the inconsistent literature on reflection described above (Lo 
et al.; Treynor et al., 2003; Winkeljohn Black & Pössel, 2013, 2015) it is unclear as to whether 
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brooding and reflection, rather than brooding alone, would mediate longitudinal associations 
between some or all of the individual negative inference and depressive symptoms.  
A final possible integrated model we suggest involves including both the proposed 
mediation and moderation models (Alloy et al., 2000).  In this combined integrative model, each 
individual negative inference predicts brooding and/or reflection while also interacting with 
rumination to predict depressive symptoms.  This model is not only consistent with the 
theoretical considerations to integrate the hopelessness model with the RST (Nolen-Hoeksema et 
al., 1992), it also would explain how both the mediation and moderation integrated models have 
been supported in the literature consistent with empirical studies supporting both of the 
suggested integrated models (Alloy et al.; Lo et al., 2008; Spasojević & Alloy. 2001).  So far, 
however, no study has tested this combined integrative model (Figure 1, bottom). 
Current Study 
Summarized, three different models – mediation, moderation, combined – have been 
proposed to integrate negative inferences (hopelessness model; Abramson et al., 1989) with 
rumination as described in the RST (Alloy et al., 2000; Lo et al., 2008; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
1992; Spasojević & Alloy, 2001).  The mediation and moderation model were empirically 
examined in multiple studies resulting in the above outlined conflicting findings.  Thus, we 
hypothesized a combined integrative model in which brooding would be predicted by all 
individual negative inferences (mediation) and would interact with the individual negative 
inferences (moderation) to predict depressive symptoms.  Based on the fact that reflection is 
either not included in many of the previous studies attempting to integrate the hopelessness and 
the RST associations between missing or when it was included, the literature about the 
association between reflection and depressive symptoms is inconsistent (Lo et al.; Treynor et al., 
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2003; Winkeljohn Black & Pössel, 2013, 2015) it seemed crucial to include reflection in the 
study.  Thus, it could not be determined a’ priori whether reflection would be predicted by the 
individual negative inferences (mediation) and would interact with the individual negative 
inferences (moderation) to predict depressive symptoms.  Further, we proposed that all 
individual negative inferences (stability, globality, consequences, and self) except inferences 
about internality would predict rumination (mediation) and interact with rumination (moderation) 
to predict depressive symptoms.  Summarized the core research questions is which of the three 
proposed integrative models (i.e., mediation, moderation, combined) best describes the 
development and maintenance of depressive symptoms and whether reflection plays a role in this 
model or not. 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants (N = 398, mean age = 23.27 years, SD = 6.57 years, age range: 18 to 52 
years, 80% female) were German college students.  From waves 1 – 3, 87 students (66 females) 
dropped out.  There were no differences between the dropouts and remaining students in sex 
(²(1) = 1.13, p = .287) or depressive symptoms (t(387) = -0.69, p = .494). However, dropouts 
were significantly older (t(396) = -2.02, p < .05). Thus, the final sample used for analyses 
included 311 participants. 
Measures 
Depressive Symptoms.  The Center for Epidemiological Studies – Depression Scale 
(CES – D; Radloff, 1977) consists of 20 items (e.g., “During the past week, there were things 
that upset me that usually do not upset me.”); developed to be as a quickly administered, 
economic screening instrument to measure depressive symptoms based on self-report.  
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Frequency of symptoms is rated on a four-point scale, with a higher sum of the item 
endorsements indicating higher frequency of occurrence.  The internal consistency and criterion 
validity of the CES-D in the standardization sample was good (α = .85; r = .56 with clinician’s 
ratings of depression, respectively). 
Negative Inferences.  The Cognitive Style Questionnaire (CSQ; Haeffel et al., 2008) 
measures inferences about causes, consequences, and the self in relation to negative events 
(Abramson et al., 1989) with 24 hypothetical event scenarios (12 negative and 12 positive).  
Only the negative event scenarios were used in this study.  Respondents were presented with a 
hypothetical event and asked to write down one cause for the event.  Respondents then rated the 
degree to which the cause of the hypothetical event was (a) internal, (b) stable, and (c) global 
(negative inferences about the causes of negative events).  Next, they rated the likelihood that 
further negative consequences would result from the event (negative inferences about 
consequences).  Finally, they rated the degree to which the occurrence of the event meant that the 
self is flawed (negative inferences about the self).  Each rating uses a 7-point Likert scale, with 
higher summed scores representing more negative inferences. Haeffel and colleagues found CSQ 
scale scores to have good internal consistency (ranging .83-.91) and criterion validity with the 
BDI-II (r = .37). 
Brooding and Reflection.  The Rumination Response Subscale (RRS) of the Response 
Styles Questionnaire (RSQ; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) consists of 18 4-point Likert 
items that measure how often a participant engaged in various behaviors in response to depressed 
mood. The RRS can be divided into the subscales brooding and reflection as well as items that 
measure depression-related cognitions (Treynor et al., 2003).  In this study, only the brooding 
(e.g., “I think ‚Why do I always react this way?‘”) and reflection (e.g., “I analyze recent events 
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to try to understand why I am depressed.”) subscales were included, as the depression-related 
subscale is often regarded as a measure of depressive symptoms and not as a measure of 
rumination distinctly separate from depression.  Higher summed scores in each subscale 
represent more engagement in those specific ruminative behaviors.  Treynor et al. found α’s of 
.77 (brooding) and .72 (reflection), as well as high correlations between depressive symptoms 
(BDI-II) and brooding (r = .44) and low correlations between depressive symptoms and 
reflection (r = .12), as expected from the literature.  
Procedures 
Participants were recruited from a participant pool of a psychology undergraduate 
program.  While the participation in a certain number of studies was a program requirement, the 
participation in the particular study was not.  Thus, the data were collected using convenience 
sampling.  Participants completed questionnaire batteries in groups of 8 to 15 at the beginning 
(wave 1), middle (wave 2), and end (wave 3) of the fall semester at 4-week intervals.  At wave 1, 
all individual negative inferences, both response styles (brooding and reflection), and depressive 
symptoms were measured.  At wave 2, only brooding and reflection were assessed, and at wave 
3, depressive symptoms were measured.  Within each wave, the order of the questionnaires was 
counterbalanced across the sample following the Latin square design.  To be able to connect data 
from the different waves while keeping confidentiality, the participants developed their own 
code based on the initial of their first name, their last name, and their date of birth.  Informed 
consent was obtained and each participant received course credit for participation.  The ethical 
committee of the German Psychological Association approved this study.  
Data Analysis 
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Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) - which estimates a likelihood function for 
each individual based on the variables that are present so that all the available data are used - was 
used, enabling the inclusion of participants with missing data to compensate for missing data 
related to attrition.  FIML is a robust estimator even if data are not missing at random (Collins, 
Schafer, & Cam, 2001; Graham, 2003).  This is of crucial importance for this study as data at 
later waves are not missing at random, as participants that dropped out being older than 
participants who remained in the study. 
To test which model fit the data best, Cole and Maxwell’s (2003) approach for multi-
wave studies using structural equation modeling was used.  The analyses were conducted with 
IBM AMOS 21 to calculate path models (Arbuckle, 1999).  Goodness of fit of the models was 
tested with ². However, as ² is known to increase with sample size and degrees of freedom, the 
² was complemented by the root mean squared of the residuals (RMSEA; Steiger & Lind, 
1980), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI; Tucker & Lewis, 1973), and Comparative Fit Index (CFI; 
Bentler, 1990).  While a full explanation of these indices and their limitations is beyond the 
scope of this article, a short description seems necessary.  Statistically nonsignificant values of ² 
indicate a good fit of the model to the data.  An RMSEA value of .00 indicates a perfect model 
fit; a value of  .05 is conventionally regarded as an indicator of a good model fit; and a value of 
 .08 is seen as acceptable (Hu & Bentler, 1999). TLI and CFI values of  .95 indicate a good 
model fit and values of  .90 are regarded as acceptable (Hu & Bentler). 
Two different tests were used to compare models.  First, ΔCFI was calculated by 
subtracting the CFI value of one model from the CFI value of another model.  When ΔCFI is > 
.002 the model with higher CFI fits the data significantly better.  When ΔCFI is ≤ .002 both 
models fit equally well from a statistical point of view and the more parsimonious model (more 
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dfs) should be accepted (Meade, Johnson, & Braddy, 2008).  Second, nested models (i.e., models 
with the same number of observed variables) were compared by subtracting the ² values as well 
as the dfs of the models from each other (² difference tests). When Δ² is significant for Δdf, the 
models are seen as significantly different from each other.  To estimate if and how much an 
integration of the hopelessness model (Abramson et al., 1989) and the RST (Nolen-Hoeksema et 
al., 1992) increases the predictive value of the cognitive constructs of both theories, percentage 
of explained variance in depressive symptoms was calculated for each model. 
To test the hypothesized mediations, a temporal relation must exist between the 
independent (e.g., inferences), mediation (brooding & reflection), and dependent variables 
(depressive symptoms) (Stice, Rohde, Seeley, & Gau, 2010): that is, the mediators must be 
measured temporally after the independent variables and before the dependent variable.  In order 
to test for multiple mediators, 95% bootstrapping confidence intervals (CIs) were calculated 
using the bias-corrected percentile method (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).  Based on this approach, 
multiple mediation effects exist when the indirect effect (i.e., the effect from independent 
variable through all possible mediators to dependent variable) is significant. 
To allow for the calculation of moderations, all variables were z-standardized.  To 
calculate the moderation variables, the z-standardized scores of the variables that were predicted 
to interact (e.g., inference about internality at wave 1 & brooding at wave 1) were multiplied 
with each other and these moderation variables (inference about internality by brooding at wave 
1) were entered along with the z-standardized scores of the original variables. All analyses were 
calculated using both the full CES-D and only the CES-D items that measure hopelessness 
depression (excluded items: 4, 10, 15, 16, 18, and 19).  As both analyses revealed the same 
pattern of results, only the findings with the full CES-D are presented here. 
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Results 
Descriptive data, internal consistency, and correlations for all instruments at all three 
waves are presented in Table 1.  The majority of the measures correlated with each other. 
Determination of the Best Fitting Model 
Six different models were tested and compared with each other to identify the model that 
fit the data best.  In all six models the influence of depressive symptoms at wave 1 was 
controlled for.  The goodness of fit indices for five of the six models were good.  However, 
Model 3 had a significant ²-value, an acceptable CFI, and unacceptable RMSEA.   
Overall, the six models can be understood as two sets of models including three models 
each.  The first set of models included the two original models: Model 1 represented the original 
hopelessness model (Abramson et al., 1989), without brooding and reflection or their interactions 
with the individual negative inferences (² (1) = .208, p = .648, CFI (1.0), RMSEA (0.001)).  
Model 2 described the RST (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1992) without negative inferences from the 
hopelessness model or their interactions with response styles (² (1) = .015, p = .901, CFI (1.0), 
RMSEA (0.001)).  Model 3 allowed for direct associations between each individual negative 
inference and both response styles (brooding and reflection) measured at wave 1 and depressive 
symptoms measured at wave 3 but did not allow for associations between the response style 
constructs and constructs of the hopelessness model (² (12) = 71.406, p = .001, CFI (.947), 
RMSEA (0.112)).  The second set of models described different versions of an integrated 
hopelessness-rumination model.  Model 4 was based on Alloy et al.’s (2000) and Ciesla and 
Roberts’ (2007) moderation model (² (3) = 1.140, p = .767, CFI (1.0), RMSEA (0.001)).  Thus, 
this model included the individual negative inferences, brooding and reflection, and the 
interaction of each of the negative inferences with brooding and reflection at wave 1 as 
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predictors of depressive symptoms at wave 3 (Figure 1, top).  Model 5 followed the proposal that 
rumination mediates the association between negative inferences and depressive symptoms.  In 
other words, Model 5 included the individual negative inferences at wave 1 and both response 
styles at wave 1 and 2 (² (4) = 5.323, p = .256, CFI (.999), RMSEA (0.029)).  Further, the 
negative inferences were directly and also through the response styles indirectly associated with 
depressive symptoms at wave 3 (Figure 1, middle).  The final model (Model 6) represented the 
combination the mediation and the moderation model to integrate the hopelessness model with 
the RST (² (6) = 5.260, p = .511, CFI (1.0), RMSEA (0.001)).  Thus, in this model the 
individual negative inferences, brooding and reflection, and the interactions between the negative 
inferences and the response styles at wave 1 were directly and indirectly through brooding and 
reflection indirectly associated with depressive symptoms at wave 3 (Figure 1, bottom).   
First, Models 1-3 (no integrations) were compared with each other.  A comparison of 
Model 1 and Model 3 demonstrated significant differences between the two, ΔCFI = 0.053; Δ² 
(11, N = 397) = 71.198, p < .001, favoring Model 1.  In addition, Model 1 explained 22.9% 
variance in depressive symptoms compared with 21.9% explained variance in Model 3.  Thus, 
Model 1, which represented the original hopelessness model (Abramson et al., 1989), was 
retained.  Similarly, a comparison of Model 2 (16.2% explained variance in depressive 
symptoms) and Model 3 favored Model 2, which represented the original RST (Nolen-Hoeksema 
et al., 1992), ΔCFI = 0.053; Δ² (11, N = 397) = 71.391, p < .001. 
Second, Models 1 and 2 were compared to the moderation model (Model 4; Figure 1, 
top).  These comparisons found nonsignificant differences: Model 1 vs. Model 4: ΔCFI = 0.000; 
Δ² (2, N = 397) = 0.932, p = .628; Model 2 vs. Model 4: ΔCFI = 0.000; Δ² (2, N = 397) = 
1.125, p = .570.  Thus, as Model 4 (25.5% explained variance) had more dfs and therefore was 
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more parsimonious, the moderation model was retained. Similarly, a comparison of Models 1 
and 2 with the mediation model (Model 5; Figure 1, middle) revealed nonsignificant differences: 
Model 1 vs. Model 5: ΔCFI = 0.001; Δ² (3, N = 397) = 5.115, p = .164; Model 2 vs. Model 5: 
ΔCFI = 0.001; Δ² (3, N = 397) = 5.308, p = .151.  Thus, as the mediation model (24.3% 
explained variance) was more parsimonious (more dfs), Model 5 was retained. 
Third, the moderation model (Model 4; Figure 1, top) and the mediation model (Model 5; 
Figure 1, middle) were compared with the combined integrative model (Model 6; Figure 1, 
bottom).  These comparisons revealed nonsignificant differences, Model 4 vs. Model 6: ΔCFI = 
0.000; Δ² (3, N = 397) = 4.120, p = .249; Model 5 vs. Model 6: ΔCFI = 0.001; Δ² (2, N = 397) 
= 0.063, p = .969.  Thus, as the combined integrative model (Model 6; 27.6% explained 
variance) had more dfs and therefore was more parsimonious, this model was retained. This 
model explained 4.7% more variance than the original hopelessness model and 11.4% more 
variance than the original RST model. 
Finally, an inspection of the associations in the combined integrated model (Model 6) 
revealed that many of the associations were not statistically significant.  Thus, following 
Burkholder and Harlow’s (2003) suggestion, we set all paths with a p ≥ .20 to zero and 
calculated a simplified combined integrated model (Model 7: ² (32) = 16.509, p = .989, CFI 
(1.0), RMSEA (0.001)).  Further, we compared Model 6 with this simplified Model 7.  This 
comparison revealed a nonsignificant difference, ΔCFI = 0.000; Δ² (26, N = 397) = 11.249, p = 
.995.  Thus, as the simplified combined integrative model (27.0% explained variance) had more 
dfs and therefore was more parsimonious, this model was retained (Figure 2). 
Analyses of Individual Associations in the Best-Fitting Model 
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As the simplified combined integrative model (Model 7) was retained, it was crucial to 
test (a) which of the cognitive variables measured at wave 1 were associated with depressive 
symptoms measured at wave 3 and (b) with of the rumination subtypes served as mediator in 
these associations.  Thus, it is of importance that only brooding at wave 2 but not reflection at 
wave 2 was significantly associated with depressive symptoms at wave 3.  Thus, all indirect 
effects were mediated by brooding at wave 2 and none by reflection at wave 2.   
Inferences about the consequences and the self, the interactions of inferences about the 
internality and stability with brooding, and brooding at wave 1 were mainly marginally 
significantly and directly associated with depressive symptoms at wave 3 (Table 2).  Further, 
inferences about the self, brooding, and reflection at wave 1 were all significantly and indirectly 
associated with depressive symptoms at wave 3 (Table 2).  Thus, the association between the 
latter three cognitive variables from both cognitive theories at wave 1 and depressive symptoms 
at wave 3 were mediated by brooding at wave 2. 
Finally, brooding and reflection at wave 1 predicted not only themselves and each other 
at wave 2, but the interaction of inferences about the stability with brooding at wave 1 as well as 
the interactions of all inferences with reflection at wave 1 predicted reflection at wave 2.  
However and as stated above, reflection at wave 2 was not significantly associated with 
depressive symptoms at wave 3.  Thus, while interesting these associations are not relevant for 
the purpose of the manuscript.  
Discussion 
The primary goal of this three-wave longitudinal study was to integrate negative 
inferences from the hopelessness model (Abramson et al., 1989) and rumination from the RST 
(Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1992) into a single model.  An integrated model in which rumination 
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was predicted by individual negative inferences and interacted with individual inferences to 
predict depressive symptoms fit the data better than the original cognitive models and the other 
integrated models.  This final integrative model merged two proposals and considered the 
differential findings on ruminative brooding and reflection, and their associations to depressive 
symptoms (Lo et al. 2008; Treynor et al., 2003; Winkeljohn Black & Pössel, 2013, 2015).  It was 
expected that brooding would be predicted by individual negative inferences and would interact 
with individual inferences to predict depressive symptoms.  However, based on the inconsistent 
literature on the association of reflection with depressive symptoms (Lo et al.; Treynor et al.; 
Winkeljohn Black & Pössel), it was unclear whether reflection would be predicted by individual 
negative inferences and would interact with individual negative inferences to predict depressive 
symptoms.  Further, it was proposed that all individual negative inferences (stability, globality, 
consequences, and self) except inferences about internality would predict brooding and also 
interact with brooding to predict depressive symptoms. 
This study revealed three important findings with regard to these hypotheses:  First, the 
combined integrated model in which rumination was predicted by individual negative inferences 
and interacted with individual inferences while affecting depressive symptoms fit the data better 
than the other tested original and integrated models. 
Second, brooding and reflection predicted depressive symptoms eight weeks later.  
However, while brooding predicted depressive symptoms directly and indirectly, reflection did 
this only indirectly via brooding.  This might explain the consistent results of previous studies 
finding only brooding predicting depression (Lo et al., 2008; Winkeljohn Black & Pössel, 2015) 
or finding both rumination subtypes predicting depression (Treynor et al., 2003; Winkeljohn 
Black & Pössel, 2013).  Consistent with the hopelessness model (Abramson et al., 1989), the 
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individual inferences about consequences and the self, but not about internality, predicted 
depressive symptoms eight weeks later.  However, not consistent with the hopelessness model 
the main effects of inferences about stability and globality did not predict depressive symptoms.  
While the lack of a significant association between the main effect of stability and depressive 
symptoms could be explained by the simultaneous inclusion of the stability by brooding 
interaction, which significantly predicted depressive symptoms, the lack of a significant 
association of inferences of globality with depressive symptoms was surprising. 
Third, reflection at wave 2 did not mediate the associations between cognitive variables 
at wave 1 and depressive symptoms at wave 3 while brooding mediated the association of 
inferences about the self with depressive symptoms.  This finding suggests that brooding 
becomes the vehicle through which an individual with a negative inferential style about the self 
processes their negative self-view.  As brooding is a passive, internal experience it makes sense 
that it would allow an individual to access internally (self)-oriented judgments.  Once these 
judgments, or inferences, are accessed, the person would experience depressive symptoms.  
If replicated, the findings of this study draw a picture of an interesting pattern of 
relationships between the negative inferences about the self (Abramson et al., 1989) and 
brooding (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1992).  Moreover, the differences among individual 
inferences’ associations to brooding and depressive symptoms indicate that future research needs 
to consistently address inferences individually rather than as a unitary construct. 
This study was the first to research the associations between individual negative inference 
styles and brooding and reflection instead of composites of multiple negative inference styles 
and the combined ruminative style.  However, this study has limitations as well.  The sole use of 
self-report instruments was a limitation of the present study.  First, a mono-method bias from 
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using the same informant and method for assessing all constructs in this study was likely.  
Second, the use of self-report instruments to measure negative inference styles and ruminative 
styles could be criticized because it is questionable how much insight individuals really have into 
their own style of thinking (for a review see Scher, Ingram, & Segal, 2005).  Therefore, 
information processing paradigms might be better suited than self-report questionnaires when 
measuring process constructs.  Thus, future studies would benefit from the use of multiple 
assessment methods (e.g., self-report questionnaires, interview data to measure depressive 
symptoms, & information processing paradigms).  Nevertheless, information-processing 
paradigms have not been developed for either of the measured cognitive constructs in the present 
study (Gotlib & Neubauer, 2000), while self-report instruments are readily available for all of 
these constructs.  Therefore, we decided to use these well-established instruments in our studies. 
Third, the internal consistency of the RSQ Brooding and Reflection subscales were lower than 
preferred, this limited reliability and consequently limits validity of the measure as well.  
However, in the validation sample for these subscales, Treynor and associates (2003) also found 
low coefficients and suggested that the small number of items comprising each subscale and not 
the quality of the items impact the reliability of scores.  Further, the low scores have also been 
found in American (Ciesla et al., 2011), Chinese (Yang, Ling, Xiao, & Yao, 2009), and other 
German (Pössel, 2011) samples; nonetheless the subscales continue to demonstrate adequate 
psychometrics and assist in studying and understanding the development of depression across 
adolescent, young adult, and adult samples globally. 
Fourth, an issue impacting the generalizability of the findings is the high proportion of 
female participants in the current study.  Thus sex disparity in studies examining associations 
between cognitive vulnerabilities and depressive symptoms is common, but it means that these 
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models should be interpreted as female-driven explanations for the onset and maintenance of 
depression.  This point becomes particularly salient when considering sex differences in 
prevalence of depressive symptoms and rumination, which prompted the development of the 
RST (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991).  Some studies found sex differences regarding how 
these cognitive vulnerabilities interact to predict depressive symptoms (e.g., Pössel, 2011), while 
others have found no differences (e.g., Ciesla & Roberts, 2007).  Thus, more equivalent 
representation of male participants is important to clarify where and how these differences exist. 
Lastly, both the hopelessness model (Abramson et al., 1989) and the RST (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 1992) are vulnerability-stress models.  Thus, the cognitive vulnerabilities from 
each model need to be activated by stressors (e.g., life events and/or daily hassles) in order to 
impact depressive symptoms.  As stress was not included in the present study, it is possible that 
the associations of cognitive variables with depressive symptoms were underestimated.  
However, the fact that many of the predicted associations were significant seems to point to the 
limited impact of the failure to include stress in the present study.   
The results of this study are especially significant for clinical applications. The identified 
integrative model provides a theoretical framework for how therapeutic techniques from one 
cognitive model can influence constructs from another model.  Moreover, the findings may 
increase the effectiveness of cognitive psychotherapies for depressive symptoms; counselors can 
integrate therapeutic techniques from different cognitive models into one theory-driven treatment 
approach (e.g., Hawley et al., 2014; Michalak et al., 2011).  For example, the finding that 
brooding mediated and moderated some of the individual inferential styles and even of reflection 
suggests that clinicians may want to concentrate on reducing brooding in clients with depressive 
symptoms. If brooding is the vehicle connecting inferential styles and depressive symptoms, 
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focusing on brooding in therapy may alleviate clients’ depressive symptoms faster. As there is 
evidence indicating that mindfulness-based treatments successfully target rumination (e.g., 
Hawley et al.), such as brooding, mindfulness could be seen as the treatment of choice for clients 
with depression if the present findings can be replicated.   
The applicability of the current findings needs to be contextualized within the age and 
developmental level of the sample.  The current sample of college students represents individuals 
in emerging adulthood, a developmental stage wherein most mental health issues emerge 
(Kessler et al., 2005).  Moreover, some studies found higher rates of depressive symptoms in 
emerging adults compared to other adult age groups (e.g., Kessler et al., 2010).  The current 
findings therefore provide college and community counselors working with emerging adults, 
with information about (a) how to integrate various cognitive approaches to treatment and (b) the 
importance of mindfulness-based interventions to target cognitive constructs contributing to 
depressed mood.  These considerations can be used in individual counseling and can inform 
college and community self-help resources and psycho-education, as well as college and 
community-level intervention and prevention programming.  While counselors provide treatment 
to a variety of developmental groups, from childhood through late adulthood, the opportunity to 
focus on intervention and prevention with this age group can soften how these emerging adults 
experience the onset and maintenance of depressive symptoms in mid- to late-adulthood.   
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Table 1 
Descriptive Data, Internal Consistencies, and Correlations between All Instruments (N ≥ 302) 
 CES-Dt1 CES-Dt3 CSQit1 CSQgt1 CSQst1 CSQcot1 CSQset1 RSQbt1 RSQrt1 RSQbt2 RSQrt2 
CES-Dt1 .90           
CES-Dt3 .38** .91          
CSQit1 .17** .17** .73         
CSQgt1 .32** .31** .40** .82        
CSQst1 .18** .19** .42** .64** .83       
CSQcot1 .32** .34** .33** .76** .52** .90      
CSQset1 .37** .38** .40** .60** .43** .65** .91     
RSQbt1 .25** .16** .20** .26** .18** .29** .36** .60    
RSQrt1 -.01 .04 .02 .10* .17** .08 .15** .35** .68   
RSQbt2 .25** .29** .16** .28** .19** .26** .34** .64** .35** .67  
RSQrt2 .06 .11 .04 .19** .19** .11 .16** .19** .71** .36** .73 
Mean 15.59 16.51 46.64 37.38 41.20 31.16 29.61 2.47 2.58 2.33 2.45 
SD 10.01 10.15 8.42 10.34 10.41 11.35 13.24 0.76 0.62 0.75 0.63 
Note. Values in the diagonal represent Cronbach’s Alpha. CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies – Depression; CSQi = CSQ, 
negative events internal-external; CSQg = CSQ, negative events general-specific; CSQs = CSQ, stable-unstable; CSQco = CSQ, 
negative inference about consequences; CSQse = CSQ, negative inference about the self; RSQb = Response Style Questionnaire, 
brooding; RSQr = Response Style Questionnaire, reflection; t1 = assessment wave 1; t2 = assessment wave 2; t3 = assessment wave 3. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01.
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Table 2 
Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects and their Confidence Intervals testing for Multiple Mediations 
among Cognitive Constructs at Times 1 and 2 and Depressive Symptoms at Time 3 
 Effects Lower  CL Upper CL 
Total effects    
CSQit1 – CES-Dt3 0.000 -0.841 1.155 
CSQgt1 – CES-Dt3 0.105 -1.374 1.243 
CSQst1– CES-Dt3 0.000 -1.057 1.034 
CSQcot1 – CES-Dt3 1.170+ 0.076 2.220 
CSQset1 – CES-Dt3 1.864* 0.926 2.886 
RSQbt1 – CES-Dt3 -0.062 -0.954 0.858 
RSQrt1 – CES-Dt3 0.273* 0.134 0.538 
CSQit1 by RSQbt1 – CES-Dt3 1.226+ 0.125 2.330 
CSQst1 by RSQbt1 – CES-Dt3 -1.068* -1.887 -0.318 
CES-Dt1 – CES-Dt3 0.272* 0.173 0.407 
RSQbt2 – CES-Dt3 1.900* 1.116 3.024 
Direct effects    
CSQcot1 – CES-Dt3 1.170+ 0.076 2.220 
CSQset1 – CES-Dt3 1.666+ 0.784 2.704 
RSQbt1 – CES-Dt3 -1.101+ -2.280 -0.010 
CSQit1 by RSQbt1 – CES-Dt3 1.226+ 0.125 2.330 
CSQst1 by RSQbt1 – CES-Dt3 -1.068* -1.887 -0.318 
CES-Dt1 – CES-Dt3 0.272* 0.173 0.407 
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RSQbt2 – CES-Dt3 1.900* 1.116 3.024 
Indirect effects    
CSQgt1 – CES-Dt3 0.105 -0.093 0.330 
CSQset1 – CES-Dt3 0.198* 0.030 0.426 
RSQbt1 – CES-Dt3 1.039* 0.532 1.790 
RSQrt1 – CES-Dt3 0.273* 0.134 0.538 
Note. CL = Confidence limit; CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies – Depression; 
CSQi = CSQ, negative events internal-external; CSQg = CSQ, negative events general-
specific; CSQs = CSQ, stable-unstable; CSQco = CSQ, negative inference about 
consequences; CSQse = CSQ, negative inference about the self; RSQb = Response Style 
Questionnaire, brooding; RSQr = Response Style Questionnaire, reflection; t1 = 
assessment wave 1; t2 = assessment wave 2; t3 = assessment wave 3. + p < .10; * p < .05 
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Figure 1. Path diagram of Models 4 (moderation), 5 (mediation), and 6 (combined integrative). In 
the mediation and combined integrative models, all constructs in wave one have paths to 
constructs in waves two and three.  For the sake of readability, this is represented by the three 
arrows coming from the thick box around the constructs at wave one.   
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Figure 2. Path diagram of Model 7 (simplified combined integrative model). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brooding 
Brooding Reflection 
Reflection 
Dep. Sx 
Globality 
Self 
Conseq. 
Stability 
Internality 
Internality x Brooding 
Stability x Brooding 
Internality x Reflection 
Globality x Reflection 
Stability x Reflection 
Conseq. x Reflection 
Self x Reflection 
 
 
 Dep. Sx 
 
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
